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This article argues that despite engaging in a powerful critique of the  ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ȋǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳȌ, 
critical terrorism scholars have sustained and reproduced this same 
construction of ǲ9/11Ǥǳ Through a systematic analysis of the research articles 
published in Critical Studies on Terrorism, this article illustrates how critical 
scholars have overall failed to extricate themselves from this dominant narrative, 
as they inhabit the same visual, emotional, and professional landscape as those 
they critique. After examining how CTS has reproduced but also renegotiated 
this narrative, the paper concludes with what Michel Foucault would describe as 
an ǲǳattacks Ȃ in this case a personal narrative of how the 
attacks did not constitute a moment of personal rupture but nonetheless later 
became a backdrop to justify my scholarship and career.  It ends with a renewal ǯǲ ?Ȁ ? ?Ǥǳ 
 
Introduction 
 ǥ ?Ȁ ? ?ǥ 
 
 ǲPre-9/11,ǳ ǲpost 9/11,ǳ ǲsince 9/11,ǳ ǲin the wake of 9/11,ǳ ǲprior to 9/11,ǳ ǲfollowing 9/11ǳ: No specific day has been quite as ubiquitous in the 21st century 
political landscape, and Critical Studies on Terrorism has led the way over the 
past 10 years in offering a powerful critique of the politics behind this temporal 
construction. From Richard Jackson (2005) to Lee Jarvis  (2008) to Jack Holland 
(2014), many have in this journal and elsewhere engaged in a thorough ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳȂ primarily one 
of rupture, but as Jarvis (2008, 246) argues also one of temporal linearity and 
timelessness. As they have demonstrated, this construction serves to justify a 
violent counter-terrorism response and delegitimize other possible responses 
such as negotiations and dialogue (Jackson 2005), ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ cause (of 
the war on terror) that itself is uncaused (Zeyfuss 2003), and silences or 
attempts to silence any alternative reading of the attacks.  ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ
observation made by Meir Sternberg (1990, 902) thatǣ ǲhe and-then form ǮǫǯǤǳ 
 
This article aims both to further this already rich literature and to challenge it. It 
aims to further it by drawing on historiographical research on the production of 
chronologies across the centuries and their political implications, particularly 
focusing on how chronologies have been used as an extension of hegemonic 
power, that is by        ǯ
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chronology. If, as William Rowlandson (2015, 20) argues, ǲǡǳ chronologies are really a debate about 
who owns time. By successfully spreading ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ
world, the US administration then led by President George W. Bush and 
sustained by western political leaders since has effectively extended western 
sovereignty over global time.  
 
In part two, the article goes further to examine how, despite critical terrorism ǯǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳǡCTS 
scholars have actually adopted this very same construction. Through a 
qualitative and quantitative analysis of every research article published by this 
journal since its inception in 2008 (totaling 219), this article will show how the 
CTS subfield has sustained and reproduced the narrative of ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ  
opening of a new era. I will argue that this has two origins. First, it reflects the 
fact that CTS scholars are part of the same visual, emotional, and professional 
landscape as mainstream international relations, security, and terrorism 
scholars. They are thus vulnerable to the same perceptive dispositions that 
Pierre Bourdieu (1977) calls habitus. The paper thus challenges the construction    ǲǳ     habitus. Second, I will argue 
that while internalizing this construction, CTS scholars renegotiated its 
understanding into a different temporal rupture from that put forward by the  ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ ǤIndeed, rather than arguing that  ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ ǲǳ
called terrorism (particularly of the radical Islamic kind), CTS scholars 
collectively have constructed a narrative in which the ǲpre- ?Ȁ ? ?ǳworld was, to 
be sure violent but was progressively inching toward less violence. It has been  ǲ- ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ       
progress and more openly embraced violent logics and practices. The section 
will conclude with why such a construction remains problematic.  
 
The final section of this paper will offer what Michel Foucault (1984, 89) calls an ǲ ,ǳ      ǲ     
nearest to it Ȃ  ǡ  ǡ ǡ ǡ  Ǥǳ     ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ Ȃ from my lived experience in New York 
City on the day of the attacks to its construction as a temporal marker in my life Ȃ 
this final section aims to offer an illustration of how what was lived as a moment 
of continuity on a personal level was later constructed, through an 
internalization of the dominant narrative, as a marker of temporal rupture. This 
final section ǲǳȋ ? ? ? ?ǡ ?Ȍ
also offers a modest counter-narrative that may become ǲǯt was 
thought that he could extend his sovereigǳ(Foucault 
1984, 87). In the conclusion, the aǯ (2003) appeal ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǡǳ
critical scholars.   
 
ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ          
time 
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A beginning is that which does not itself follow anything by causal 
necessity, but after which something naturally is or comes to be 
(Aristotle 1902, 31).  
 
 
As Jarvis and Holland (2014, 194-195) effectǡǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ
universally adopted ǲǳǲ ? ? ? ? ? ?
crisis and historical discontinuity.ǳ2 	
Ǥǯǲǳȋd 2014, 194) to then-Vice 
President ǯ ǲ   ǳ ȋ in Jarvis 2008, 246), the administration 
successfully called upon the US public and beyond to mark the memory as a 
fundamental break not only in the life of the United States as a nation, or in 
international politics more broadly, but in their own lives. As noted by Maja 
Zeyfuss (2003, 514), when Bush told  ǲ 
wh   ǡǳ      ǲ    ǳ
(Zeyfuss  ? ? ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?ȌǤ ǲ         
means, about what, if anything, we should do, September 11 had already been 
turned into a symbol, into a watershedǳ (Zeyfuss 2003, 525). US administration 
officials, relayed by other poǡǲly ǳǲǳȋ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ?Ȍ
succeeded the attacks so that ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ  come ǲ   ǳȋkson 2005, 33).  
    Ǥ      ǯǡǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳǲǡǡǳȋ ? ? ? ǡ ? ? ?ȌȂ a cause that crucially 
was uncaused. In this narrative3, any relationship between previous US policies 
and the attacks was eliminated,  ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ      
perpetrators needed to be destroyed.  
 
It was as if nothing had ever happened beforeǥ In other words, the 
events of September 11 are the Ǯǯ  Ǥ
not, however, ask how we got there lest we be disrespectful of the 
dead. (Zeyfuss, 2003: 520) 
 
This construction allowed the US administration to delegitimize any questioning 
or even reference to the decades of violent US policy in the Middle East and 
elsewhere. They were irrelevant as they had not caused the attacks, and 
mentioning them became an unpatriotic attempt to justify these callous acts (see 
also Jackson 2005).  
 
Importantly, this watershed narrative was extremely effective in both 
legitimizing the actions of states domestically and internationally and in 
delegitimizing dissenting voices. ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍǲǳ
was written as the only natural and just response to the attacks. ǲ  
purposes of constructing a myth of exceptional grievance is to divest the nation 
of the moral responsibility for counter-ǳ ȋ  ? ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ȌǤOn the 
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other hand, alternative non-violent responses were delegitimized. As George W. 
Bush (quoted in Toros 2012, 163Ȍ ? ? ? ?ǡǲthe only way to deal with these 
people is to Ǥǯǡǯ Ǥǳ ǡ  ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ        
policies of violent counter-terrorism the world over and undermined those 
working toward non-violent responses. Furthermore, this narrative not only 
dominated political circles but was adopted by mainstream terrorism and 
security studies. To quote but a few, Bruce Hoffman (2006, 22), one of the most ǡǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳǢPaul 
Wilkinson (2011, 9), in his later edition of Terrorism vs Democracy: The Liberal 
State Response,   ǲ  ?Ȁ ? ? ǥ 
effect not only on US foreign and security policy and public opinion. They had a 
major influence on international relations, the US and international economy and Ǥǳ 
 
Many of the aǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ
moment of temporal rupture have thus already been made. Here however I wish   ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ  
universal adoption was an extension of US hegemony over world time. To 
support this argument, it is useful to draw on historiographical work on how the 
establishment of eras and chronologies has historically been a means to extend Ǥǯ (1991, 290) analysis of 
East Asian chronologies and the establishment of eras linked to new dynasties 
stresses how the adoption by other states of the new era name represented the 
extension of sovereign power.   
 
It became normal practice in international relations that a country 
under the suzerainty of another country should use the era name of 
the suzerain country. This shows that an era name was a mirror 
reflecting the realities themselves, going beyond the sphere of 
symbol. (Sato 1991, 290).  
 
In another example, the near universal adoption of the Christian Gregorian 
calendar with the fundamental rupture built around the birth of Jesus Christ, can 
be seen as part of Christian and Western hegemonic extension (Sato 1991; 
Mazrui 2001).  For Ali Mazrui (2001, 15), it is   ǲan informal cultural 
empire is born, hegemony triumphant.ǳ 
 
Many countries in Africa and Asia have adopted wholesale the 
Western Christian calendar as their own. They celebrate their 
independence day according to the Christian calendar, and write their 
own history according to Gregorian years, using distinctions such as 
before or after Christ. Some Muslim countries even recognize Sunday 
as the day of rest instead of Friday. In some cultures, the entire 
Islamic historiography has been reperiodized according to the 
Christian calendar instead of the Hijjra. 
 
Indeed, very few countries have not adopted the BC/AD or BCE/CE timeframe, 
such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, which can be seen as much as an insistence in 
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maintaining their cultural and religious heritage as a rejection of Western 
hegemony over their time.  
 ǡ           ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ  Ȃ ǲ-ǲǲ- ?Ȁ ? ?ǳȂ is a discursively 
hegemonic move that extends US sovereignty over timeframes outside the  Ǥ ǡ ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ         ǡ
but a global one. Examples of this can be found in government statements the 
world over. Manuel Valls, then French interior minister, noted in a key speech on 
the reform of the French intelligence services that they had to keep their focus ǡǲǳ ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ4 disregarding attacks by al Qaeda 
in Paris in 1996. The key UK counter-terrorism CONTEST (2011: 15) strategy 
document concludes its Ex    ǡ ǲ
counter-terrorism work since 9/11 has made considerable progress in reducing 
the threats we faceǳ Ȃ forgetting the decades of British counter-terrorism work 
in Northern Ireland. From 2001 to 2006, 14 African countries passed counter-        ǲ -ǳ (Knudsen 
2015) push by the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee and donor   ǲUnited Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 
1373 calling on member states to become party to all relevant international 
conventions on terrorism and to enact the necessary domestic legislation to   ǳ ȋWhitaker 2007, 2018). Even the prime minister of 
the small island state of Barbados, with an extremely low terrorism threat, spoke ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳǤ5 
 
Thus, I argue that the narrative ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳdoes 
more than legitimize violent counter-terrorism policies and legislation, 
delegitimize non-violent responses such as negotiation and dialogue, and silence 
dissenting voices. It extends US hegemony over world time, establishing the new ǲ  ?Ȁ ? ?ǳmuch like the imposition of eras linked to Chinese dynasties in 
East Asia. Despite different worlds being marked by different moments of 
temporal rupture Ȃ the fall of the Berlin Wall for some, the Rwandan genocide for 
others, the 2004 Tsunami for others still Ȃ ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ
adopted as a moment of temporal rupture, which did not completely replace 
these other moments but took its own place as a moment of universal temporal 




ǣǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ 
 
This sovereignty also extended to the sub-field of critical terrorism studies 
(CTS). Indeed, the main contention of this article is that although CTS has      ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ ǡ   
succumbed to its sovereignty by internalizing and adopting ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ
of temporal rupture. This may be inevitable. Sternberg (1990, 901) indeed 
argues         ǲ   Ǯǯǥǯ
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power with each abortive rebellion.ǳǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳgy, CTS is 
forced to restate.  
 
However, beyond this somewhat facile argument, an analysis of the CTS ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳtaken 
on ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ   of temporal rupture. After presenting data based on a 
qualitative and quantitative analysis of all research articles published in this 
journal since its inception, I will argue that this journal demonstrates both a 
process of internalization ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳȂ the result 
of a powerful habitus in the social and professional fields inhabited by CTS 
scholars Ȃ and an adoption of this construction in a widespread narrative in CTS 
that distinguishes   ǲ- ?Ȁ ? ? ǳ     
counter-emancipatory violence but were slowly progressing toward a reduction 
of these counter-emancipatory practices, and  ǲ- ?Ȁ ? ? ǳ  
states unashamedly increased these counter-emancipatory violent practices, 
now sustained by overt counter-emancipatory narratives.  
 
A simple descriptive statistical analysis shows that of the 219 research articles 
published by this journal since its first volume in 2008 (excluding interviews, 
review articles, book reviews and forums), 210 articles (96 percent) made 
referenced to the 9/11 attacks. In total, 131 articles (60 percent) used the 
attacks as a moment of temporal rupture (62 percent of those referring to the 
attacks). ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳǲ ? ?thǳǲ ? ?ǳ
simply ǲ ǳ tacks with the former garnering 955 references 
compared to 301 for all three latter labels. Of the 955 ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǡǳ 633 
used the term as a marker of temporal rupture (66 percent) using any of the 
following expressions: ǲ  ?Ȁ ? ?ǡǳ ǲ  ?Ȁ ? ?ǡǳ ǲ- ?Ȁ ? ?ǡǳ ǲ- ?Ȁ ? ?ǡǳǲ  ?Ȁ ? ?ǡǳ ǲ   ?Ȁ ? ?ǡǳ ǲ  ?Ȁ ? ?ǡǳ  ǲ      ?Ȁ ? ?ǤǳIn a 
search using the same language constructions for temporal rupture, any of the 
three labels using the  ǲǳ   ? ? percent of the total 
references. Some articles were particularly prone to this construction. Excluding 
the Jarvis and Holland article (2014) that specifically deals with the question of  ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳǡȋ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ
Pokalova 2013, Clini 2015, and Fieganbaum and Weissman 2016) referred to ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ   ? ?, with Clini (2015) 
having the highest number of references at 26 in an article entitled ǲ ǫ        .ǳ 
Another 14 articles used this construction more than 10 times. On average, 
counting all the 219 research articles published by Critical Studies on Terrorism, ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ          ?   
published and the thre ǲǳ  figured as temporal rupture 0.7 
times per article.   
 
Although this simple statistical analysis gives a sense of the extent of this 
construction in CTS, a qualitative analysis of each article offers a fuller picture of ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳǲȋ ? ?Ȍȋ ? ?thȌǳǤ To  ǡ ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ         
question of terrorism and counter-terrorism. There are thus references to a ǲ- ?Ȁ ? ?ǳȋ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ?Ȍǡ ǲst-9/11 
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ǳ ȋ  ? ? ? ?, 475), and a reference   ǲ-9/11 animal 
liberationǳ  ȋ  ? ? ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?ȌǤ   ǲ- ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ    ǡ  ȋ ? ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?Ȍ   ǲ-9/11 
multiculǳ for example. Some present this rupture as all encompassing. 
For Rykkja, Laegreid, and Fimreite (2011, 220), ǲ ?Ȁ ? ? Ǯǯǡ  
insecure and dangerousǡǳ    ǯ   chief editor, 
Jackson (2015, 50), the ǲepistemological crisis of terrorism is now an inherently 
expansionary, self-replicating and increasingly structurally embedded feature of 
the post-9/11 worldǤǳ     ǲst-9/11 worldǳ in CTS. In this world, 
little things have changed so that we are told that ǲafter 9/11, Osama became a 
fashionable name in Pakistan (and throughout the Muslim world)ǳ (Nazir 2010, 
74). More important things have changed too, as Oriola (2009, 261) tells us that ǲn ?Ȁ ? ?Ǥǳ 
 ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ  ǡ     ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǤǳIn some cases, this may be ǡ
ȋ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ?Ȍǡǲpost-9/11 
adoption of social science methodologies by Western military forces is not ǡǳǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳat all. For ǡǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ
rupture is forced into a sentence aimed at stating temporal continuity. Thus, 
Milton-Edwards  (2012, 219) ǲfar from leading the revolutionary wave and 
jihadi vanguard, as Islamists were characterised to be doing throughout the 
1980s and 1990s and the post-9/11 era, there is already evidence to suggest that ǯ          
movementǤǳ  ǡ  ǲ ? ? ? ?ǳ  ǲ- ?Ȁ ? ?ǤǳInterestingly, only one 
article (Gentry and Whitworth 2011) rejects  ?Ȁ ? ?   ǲ ǳ       ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ      
subject of       ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ    marker. So 
Jeffrey Sluka (2008, 179) writes that  
 
Amnesty International has extensively documented the fact that 
global human rights suffered serious setbacks and state terrorism 
massively escalated during the 1970s and 1980s, and that this trend 
continued through the 1990s and into the new century after the Ǯ ?Ȁ ? ?ǯǡ which stimulated a major new global surge in Ǯǯ measures. 
 ǡǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳǡrupture through its 
accentuation of this trend. Indeed, 19 articles presented this double approach to ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳǤ 
 
A simple statistical analysis followed by an in depth qualitative investigation 
thus show that CTS has as a sub-ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ
temporal rupture. I argue that there are two reasons for this: one is linked to an 
internalization of the social and professional landscape in which CTS scholars Ȃ 
more or less willingly Ȃ inhabit; the other, is the result of the explicit or implicit 
renegotiation of this narrative   ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ      
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temporal rupture, but one that is characterized by a qualitative change in state 
violence rather than in non-state violence. Each argument will be dealt with in 
turn.  
 
Bourdieuǯ (1977) practical theory and particularly his understanding of habitus 
are particularly helpful to understand how CTS scholars have internalized the  ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳnarrative. Habitus   ȋ ? ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?Ȍ  ǲ  
schemes of perception and thought,ǳǲǳ
actors, ǲ    ǡǳ  ǲ    
and to accept it much more readily th   ǳ (Bourdieu 1989, 
18). In the case of CTS scholars, these perceptive dispositions are drawn from 
their sharing the very same visual, political, emotional and professional 
landscape as that of policymakers and traditional scholars after the attacks. ǡǲǳt day Ȃ when he exhorted, as paraphrased by Zeyfuss (2003, 514) to ǲǤ Ǥ  ǳ Ȃ this included CTS scholars and not only those we 
study or critique.  CTS scholars ǲunder the influence of a strong visual 
memory and the horror of a tragedyǳ (Zeyfuss 2003, 522).  ǡǲdialectic 
of the internalization of externality and the externalization of internalityǳ
(Bourdieu 1977, 72 emphasis in original), I argue that CTS scholars internalized 
the    ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ    ǡ   
transformation.  
 
This is not only an individual internalization due to a personal response to the 
attacks, but also arguably a collective one. Indeed, CTS scholars are part of the 
same professional environment as the far more numerous traditional terrorism 
and security scholars. We attend the same conferences (the International Studies 
Association (ISA) Annual Convention, the British International Studies 
Association (BISA) Conference, Political Studies Association (PSA) among 
others), sometimes publish in the same journals, and most importantly, have 
positioned our work in opposition to traditional terrorism scholarship.  This 
positioning required Ȃ at least to some degree Ȃ a reproduction of the dominant 
narratives in order for them to be countered. As Michel Foucault (1984, 78) ǡ  ǲ  ǳ   by ǲthe passion of scholars, their 
reciprocal hatred, their fanatical and unending discussions, and their spirit of Ǥǳǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ
and unending discussions and our spirit of competition with traditional security Ǥǲ ?Ȁ ? ?,ǳ ǲ- ?Ȁ ? ?ǡǳǲ- ?Ȁ ? ?ǡǳǤ, was a 
means to challenge traditional terrorism scholars on their own turf and using 
their own language. I would argue that we thus collectively internalized the   ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ    be able to insert ourselves in the 
professional field of security and terrorism studies.  
 
Individuals do not however simply reproduce dominant narratives or practices. 
According to Bourdieu, individuals are continuously renegotiating and 
transforming Ȃ sometimes in a barely noticeable fashion Ȃ social relations. 
Therefore, ǲ  merely enacting an already established system of 
exchange by the following of rules, individuals renegotiate their relations with 
other individuals by manipulating common undersǳ ȋ  ? ? ? ?ǡ 421). 
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CTS scholars have not simpl  ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ     
renegotiated it and adapted it for greater coherence with the other perceptive 
dispositions that dominate our subfield. Indeed, an analysis of the temporal 
rupture narrative in CTS shows that CTS scholars do not present this rupture as 
one between a safe world made insecure by terrorism, but rather as one of an 
already violent world that was made more violent b ǯ   ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ 
moral and political justification for violent counter-terrorism practices.  
 
This is visible in many of the arguments published in this journal. Out of the 131 
articles using the attacks as temporal rupture, 58 (44 percent) present it as a 
moment of increase in state violence, making the latter as the single most 
referred to issue in the temporal rupture constructions. A qualitative analysis 
further reveals the extent of this: 	 
 ȋ ? ? ? ?ǣ  ? ?Ȍ  ǡ ǲthe 
scale of victimisation as a result of state led counterterrorism policies at home    Ǯ ?Ȁ ? ?ǯ far exceeds that of officially recognised terrorist 
violence.ǳ        ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ   
studies of state violence (see Blakeley 2009), but nevertheless state violence is 
seen as having qualitatively and quantitatively change  ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?Ǥǳ From 
discourses (ǲ-9/11 counter-terrorism discourse has fulfilled our worst fearsǳ 
(Zulaika and Douglass 2008, 29)) to legislation (ǲ  ?Ȁ ? ?ǡ  
proliferation of anti-terror laws in Australia is in a class of its ownǳ (Oriola 2009, 
260)) to practices (  ǲstimulated a major new global surge in state      ǲ-ǳ ǳ ȋ  ? ? ? ?, 
179)), CTS has placed a particular focus on this change.  
 
In particular, human and civil rights and liberties are presented as under greater  ǲ- ?Ȁ ? ?ǳǤȋ ? ? ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?ȌǡǲȏȐince 9/11, 
the geography of Manhattan has been saturated with surveillance technologies 
that serve as a living laboratory for the establishment of a ubiquitous security 
apparatus   Ǥǳ This threat to the rights and liberties of 
individuals is particularly true for Muslims living in Western countries. Cherney 
and Murphy (2016, 159) state that: ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǡeral feeling among 
Muslims living in the West that theǮǯǡǳdue to what  ȋ ? ? ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?Ȍ   ǲa moral panic about Muslims post- ?Ȁ ? ?Ǥǳ The 
situation is presented as so dire that Grossman (2014, 321) feels the need to   ǲǮ  ǯ can coexist in a post- ?Ȁ ? ? Ǥǳ It is 
important to note that the aim of this list is not to contest that many of the ǲ- ?Ȁ ? ?ǳǡ
how our subfield has reproduced and sustained, but importantly also 
renegotiated the construction ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳǤ 
 
There are several important conclusions to be drawn from this analysis. First, we 
CTS scholars are not as exceptional as we may think we are, and this can be seen         ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ    
traditional terrorism, security, and IR scholars. We too saw the towers crumble, 
we too were told to remember that moment for its exceptionality, its extreme 
violence, the fear it spread in Westerners, us included. When Butler (cited in 
Wibben 2001,  ? ? ?Ȍǲnced something 
like the loss of their First-Worldism as a result of September 11 and its 
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ǡǳǤTo this personal response to 
the attacks, one can add a powerful professional one. Our work is in part relevant 
because of  ǲ9/11.ǳ         ǲ  ǳ    ǡ     
important. There would be fewer panels in conferences, fewer publications, 
maybe no Critical Studies on Terrorism, and overall fewer jobs. This article would 
not be published. We are, to a certain degree, professionally relevant because of ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳǯǤ  
 
Furthermore, tǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳhowever has a cost. 
First, this makes some of our research ahistorical Ȃ possibly one of the worst 
crimes from a CTS perspective. Indeed, although numerous social and political 
practices may have ch   ǲ- ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ - such as the 
representation of Muslim minorities, or the proliferation of counter-terrorism 
legislation -   ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ       
spreading it far beyond counter-terrorism practice, we are imposing an alien and 
essentially hegemonic chronology on other fields. Feminism, culture, cartoons, 
names in Pakistan and elsewhere, may not have all changed drastically on ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?Ǥǳ If they did, we need to support this with evidence to justify starting our 
chronology on that day. I must stress that am not arguing here that any scholars 
cited in this paper are examples of bad practice or bad research, and I myself 
have written and spoken statements such as these (see part three of this article). 
The argument here is rather that CTS collectively has Ȃ largely unknowingly Ȃ 
fallen   ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ -trap, and that by adopting this starting point 
for chronologies by default and (at times) without supporting evidence, we are 
guilty of the same ahistoricism we regularly accuse traditional terrorism 
scholars and others of.  
 
Second, we run the risk of partially depoliticizing Ȃ and indeed exonerating Ȃ the Ǥǲ ǳǲ- ?Ȁ ? ?ǳsemantically accepting that these ǲǳǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǤǳMuch of this is part of the critique already put forward         ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ    (as 
discussed in part one)Ǥǲ- ?Ȁ ? ?ǳȂ even if it focused on state 
violence Ȃ assumes that the violent response chosen by state actors was the only 
course of action. It is presented as a natural knee-ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?Ǥǳǡ
whether acting excessively or not, states are exonerated from firing the first shot 
in t Ǥ ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ       ȋ  ? ? ? ?ȌǤ
Furthermore, it turns ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳinto the cause of some cases of state violence that 
CTS and others have demonstrated to be unrelated to the attacks themselves, the 
2003 invasion of Iraq being a prime example of this. From the extraordinary 
manipulation of intelligence findings to the military-industrial agenda pursued 
by the George W. Bush administration, there are few left arguing that the Iraq ǲǳǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ (Kauffman 2004), and incorporating the war in 
Iraq and its aftermath   ǲ- ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ   exonerating 
smokescreen we have worked so hard to remove. Indeed, pushing this argument 
further, it can be argued that ǯǲ ǳȂ from domestic 
counter-radicalization strategies, to western and non-western alliances to defeat 
the so-called Islamic State, to state policies toward refugees and migrants Ȃ are 
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more connected to the war in Iraq and its subsequent ramifications than they are 
to the al Qaeda which carried out the September 11, 2001 attacks. Thus, the 
terrorism/counter-terrorism landscape that we are in today is arguably far more ǲ- ? ? ? ?ǡǳ-15 years of insurgency experience for 
both state and non-state actors and the recent question of returnees, than a ǲt- ?Ȁ ? ? ǤǳS     ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ   
rupture Ȃ however renegotiated Ȃ arguably undermines some of the key 
principles and goals of CTS: It risks making our research ahistorical and risks at 
least partially exonerating the very state violence we have spent 10 years 
exposing.  
 
The Stoics and Reflexive Narratives 
 
How can this ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ
be undone? One means may be a reflexive analysis of how this construction has 
crept into each of our lives. Reflexive analysis is what allows human beings to be      ǲ  ǳ    ǲation of internalitǤǳ  moments of reflection, we can 
transform habitus. Indeed, drawing on the Stoics, Bourdieu invites us to judge a 
human being by their second reaction to an event, rather than their first.  
 
The Stoics used to say that what depends upon us is not the first move 
but only the second one. It is difficult to control the first inclination of 
habitus, but reflexive analysis, which teaches that we are the ones 
who endow the situation with part of the potency it has over us, 
allows us to alter our perception of the situation and thereby our 
reaction to it. It enables us to monitor, up to a certain point, some of 
the determinisms that operate through the relation of immediate 
complicity between position and dispositions. (Bourdieu in Bourdieu 
and Wacquant 1992, 133).  
    ǡ            ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ
went from being a moment that did not shake my inner self to a moment that 
marked the start of a clear chronology in my professional life as a CTS scholar.  
 
Inserting itself in the broader move toward autoethnographic work in 
international relations and security studies (see for example the work of 
Inayatullah 2010, Dauphinee 2013, and powerful work published in the Journal 
of Narrative Politics), this section stands as an ǲnǳvery behavior 
critiqued in this article and illustrates how such a transformation can occur in its 
minutiae.        ǲ      ǳ
(Inayatullah 2010, 2). It is also the result of the adoption of a methodology that is ǲǡǳǲǡ     ǳ ȋ  ? ? ?0, 2). Thus, this    	 ǲ ǳ hopes to illustrate 
intimately ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ
time in one CTS scholar.  
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It also offers an alternative story. Carol Cohn (2000, 146) argues that ǲstories 
circulate like paper currency, passed on from hand to hand, without anyone ever 
seeing, or asking to see, the gold that backs it upǤǳ ǣǲAs in any 
other institution, the power of the stories comes not from their evidentiary value 
(even though they are often offered as evidence), but from their ability to 
condense and symbolize something that people believe and think important.ǳWe 
have all been told endless times the story ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳthe life of the 
young (white) American man who saw the towers falling on TV and realized he 
needs to fight to defend his people. The aim of the final section is thus also to 
offer another story ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳitself did not represent a temporal rupture, 
but rather a story of continuity that can be passed on as a counter- narrative.  
 	ǡǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǤIn fact, I slept through the 
attacks. I was less than three miles away in a flat in Brooklyn, barely asleep after 
an overnight shift at The Associated Press where I worked as an editor on the 
International Desk. My 90-something landlady sent her West Indies carer to ǡǲǤǤǳ  ǯ
both towers had already fallen, one I think had and I may have seen the second Ǥǯ. I thought of my friend Amy, who had left the 
AP to work for the Wall Street Journal, the offices of which were in the World 
Financial Center, across the street from the World Trade Center. She lived nearby 
in Brooklyn and I walked to her house and rang her doorbell over and over 
again. I remember screaming her name. It was completely useless as she clearly 
was not there. I walked further up toward the Brooklyn Bridge, woke up my 
cousin and aunt (night owls). By midday, I stood on the Brooklyn promenade Ȃ 
one of my favorite places in the entire world Ȃ and watched the fire, the ashes, 
the paper blow across the East River into Brooklyn. The only thing I remember 
clearly was a man selling throwaway cameras, saying something along the lines ǡǲǯr chance! Take a picture of history as it happens!ǳ
being both disgusted by his callousness and in awe of his quick thinking: ǲǫǨǳ That is maybe the only 
feeling I remember of that day, being impressed by how life went on. By 6 pm, I 
took the subway: The F Train that usually passes under Lower Manhattan had 
been diverted but it took me right into work at Rockefeller Center. I was not even 
late to work that day. I was not afraid or shaken. I felt for the people who died 
and their families, but my heart did not break that day.  
 
My heart had broken on March 29 of that year and in the week that followed the 
death of my friend, Kerem Lawton.  ǲ	-Worldism,ǳ    , had 
been lost six months prior, when a young man who resembled me in personal 
history, education, profession, and cheek Ȃ someone just like me Ȃ had been 
killed reporting on the shelling of a village in Kosovo, part of the spillover from 
the conflict in neighboring Macedonia. By September 11, I knew already that 
violence could rip even nice middleclass professional families, shatter our 
misplaced sense of security. I had already seen the pain but also the void and 
incomprehension left by sudden death, particularly the sudden death of young 
professionalsǡ  ǲ  ǳ          Ǥ ǯhad shaken me to 
the core, undermined my trust in the world, shattered the arrogant belief that 
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things (for us) ǲwould be okay.ǳMy body had already been inhabited by pain and 
occupied by fear months before the attacks. 
 
My eyes had also already seen massive destruction Ȃ destruction far greater than 
that of the Twin Towers. In August 1999, I had covered the earthquake that had 
destroyed thousands of homes across 200 kilometers and killed more than 
17,000 people in Western Turkey. I had already seen building after building 
flattened like stacks of pancakes. So many buildings had collapsed that many of 
them did not see any rescue operation for days. So I remember Ȃ much more 
vividly than any visual memory of the September 11 attacks Ȃ sitting with a 
woman at the bottom of a pile of rubble as she screamed the names of her two 
children. They were trapped or dead underneath the building and no one was 
looking for them. Proper rescue teams had not yet arrived in her town and the 
few surviving local firemen were working to extract people from another 
building further down the road where other parents pleaded with them. So we 
sat there on that warm morning of August 17, 1999, surrounded by death.  
 
Over the years, however, people have found far more interesting the fact that I ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳǤThey either ask ǲǫǳǲhow it was.ǳ
my story of how I slept through it Ȃ it leads to some surprise, some laughter. 
Then I quickly go on to say that wǯ
the joint houses on September 20, 2001. This is where my ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ 
begins, contributing in its own small way to the    ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ 
temporal rupture, one in which stateǯ increased their direct, structural and 
cultural violence under the banner of counter-terrorism. I tell of how tears rolled 
down my face as I saw New Yorkers in a hip ǯ
as we watched him on a giant screen promise war onto the world. Then I 
remember the feeling of discomfort, even offense, when I found a framed picture 
of the still-standing Twin Towers with a hand-ǲǡǨǳ-in-the-ǯbreakfast on my 
way to work every morning. Countless times I have told the story of how I ǲǳ ǡ ǲ    ǡ     Ǩǳ I 
recount the discomfort of being a foreigner, even in New York where everyone is ǲǡǳhow I eventually left the United States, gave up journalism, and 
went back to university to study conflict resolution and focus on terrorism.  
 
 ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳthus came into my life as a temporal rupture that changes the character 
of New York from a welcoming cosmopolitan city to a culturally violent 
nationalistic environment in which I did not feel welcome. The attacks that I 
lived through without going through profound shock or pain Ȃ possibly because I 
had been jolted by both shock and pain just a few months earlier Ȃ and that did 
not come to represent a sharp moment of rupture in my life became such a 
moment months and then years after the attacks. Indeed, this narrative 
strengthened the more I studied global counter-terrorism practices, dialogued 
with other CTS scholars, and challenged mainstream security and terrorism 
studies in their ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǤǳThis invariably entered my own writing. 
So my book (Toros 2012) makes seven references to the attacks, six of them as 
temporal rupture. The references are also all-ǲ-
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S ? ?ǳȋToros 2012, 19). In my teaching, although I argue that        ǲ  ?Ȁ ? ?ǡǳ     ǲ- ?Ȁ ? ?ǳǲ- ?Ȁ ? ?ǳǡ
state violent responses. I may have slept through the attacks and later been 
struck by the continuity of life, but in the months and years that followed them, ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳnal and professional narratives as a moment of 




If the aim of this article were only to point an accusatory finger at my colleagues 
and myself in CTS, it would be of minimal utility. The article has indeed 
illustrated through a quantitative and qualitative analysis of all research articles 
published in thiǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ
moment of temporal rupture. It has argued that this can be traced to an 
internalization of the habitus by CTS scholars both personally as human beings 
emotionally affected by the attacks and professionally as scholars inserting 
themselves in the narrative dominating security and terrorism studies. This 
internalization however has come with a renegotiation of this narrative that has  ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ           ?Ȁ ? ?
world to one threatened by terrorism, to a moment of rupture from a violent but 
slowly improving world to one now driven by the increasingly violent logics of 
counter-terrorism and state repression. The article argued that this CTS 
narrative puts us at risk of being guilty of the very ahistoricism we accuse 
traditional terrorism scholars of and more importantly of depoliticizing state ǲǳǲ ?Ȁ ? ?Ǥǳ The final section of the article offers an example Ȃ a story Ȃ of how          ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ
narrative that strengthened over time and became part of the collective CTS 
narrative.  
 
This article though aims to do more than point an accusatory finger or indulge in 
a public mea culpa. It is an appeal to  ǯ appeal (2003) nearly 15 ǲ	  ? ?ǤǳSuch a 
collective act of forgetting no doubt  Ǥ ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǡǳ     ǡ
has helped CTS be relevant, be listened to, even by those simply intent on 
dismissing or denigrating our arguments. Ten years into CTS however I believe 
we have the professional and institutional strength to abandon this problematic 
platform: Taking a step down at this point is not as costly as it may seem. But if   ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǡǳ      ǫA coherent CTS answer is: We  ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ whichever starting date is most relevant to the subject at 
hand. Thus Indian or American cinema may have indeed transformed after the 
September 11, 2001 attacks, but they may not have, and an investigation into 
their endogenous chronology is essential. The same thing is true for cartooning, 
culture, and the first names preferred in Muslim-majority countries. Each of 
these areas of research Ȃ many of them only tangentially related to terrorist and 
counter-terrorist violence Ȃ are likely to have very different chronologies from   ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ ǤWe could go further and focus on the repetitive 
everyday nature of political violence, moving altogether away from an 
understanding of time ǲ ǡ ǡ    Ǣ
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time as departure, progression, and arrival Ȃ ǡǳ
(Kristeva, Jardine and Blake 1981, 17), in favor of a cyclical understanding of 
time that one can find in feminist methodologies (Felski 2000, 2002). Whichever 
avenue we choose, we should finally liberate research from the hegemonic ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳǤcan start by ensuring ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ
temporal marker, we have carried out a thorough investigation (via whichever 
methodology one may choose) and can provide the supporting evidence that 
demoǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ a temporal rupture.  
 
In this move away from the hegemonic chronology we will be aided by the    ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ have finally past its sell-by date. 
Anecdotally, in the past few years, several of my students have had difficulty ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳǡferring to the attacks that took place on 
September 9, 2001 or in September 2011. Indeed, to someone born in 1999, the 
attacks make as much sense in a timeline beginning six years ago as in one 
beginning 16 years ago. And such forgetting may go beyond the younger 
generations. In 2016, then US presidential hopeful Donald Trump spoke of ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳȋȌǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǡǳ6 and according to a poll carried 
out by the Pew Research Centre the same year, only 68 percent of American 
adults can correctly identify 2001 as the year of the attacks.7  This is not 
ignorance as much as a natural passage of time in which the visual and emotional 
memory of an event slowly dissipates.  
 
In the case of our students, we are therefore     ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ 
narrative, we are actually instilling it by asking them to adopt intellectually a 
collective memory that, in their case, is not individual. As argued by several ǡǲ Ǯǯ ǳ ǲy experiences cannot be processed into memories without reliance        ǳ ȋ-Kelly 
2012, 1; 2013). In this case, we are imposing social frameworks of language and 
political understanding on students who do not have the sensory experiences of 
the attacks. We are actually imposing hegemonic memories on them, rather than 
simply sustaining them. Thus, for them and for us this article concludes with an 
appeal to return to one of the founding principles of CTS: embedding our 
analysis in the socio-historical context of Ǥ	ǲ ?Ȁ ? ?ǳ
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